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Snap and Destroy: Preservation Issues for 
Ephemeral Communications 
RYAN G. GANZENMULLER† 
INTRODUCTION 
In an Internet age where “delete” no longer means “gone 
forever,” the desire for short-lived communications has 
risen.1 The founder of Wickr, a mobile application for 
impermanent media, opined that “[e]phemeral data is the 
future.”2 This is supported by the meteoric rise of Snapchat, 
the self-destructing photo application that has grown into a 
startup valuated at an estimated $10 billion just three years 
after its founding.3 While Snapchat thrives in younger 
  
† Editor-in-Chief, Buffalo Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2015, SUNY Buffalo Law 
School; B.A., 2012, Binghamton University. Special thanks to Professor Christine 
Bartholomew for her invaluable guidance on this Comment and throughout law 
school. Thanks also to Professor Mark Bartholomew for his advice and to Anna 
Kreiter and Brooke Leone for critiquing my draft. I am grateful for the love and 
support of my family and friends, especially the ones who sent me countless Snaps 
to inspire this Comment. Finally, thanks to the Buffalo Law Review members for 
their efforts, my Editorial Board members for their unending hard work and 
dedication, and Erin Connare for her editorial work on this Comment. 
 1. John G. Browning, Burn after Reading: Preservation and Spoliation of 
Evidence in the Age of Facebook, 16 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 273, 275, 306 (2013) 
[hereinafter Browning, Burn after Reading]; Felix Gillette, Snapchat and the 
Erasable Future of Social Media, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-02-07/snapchat-and-the-erasable-
future-of-social-media. 
 2. Gillette, supra note 1. 
 3. Serena Saitto, Snapchat Said to Close Yahoo Funding, Still Raising Money, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-22/
snapchat-said-to-close-yahoo-funding-still-raising-money.html. This valuation 
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demographics,4 Vaporstream is making a name for itself 
among corporate elites who wish to communicate discreetly 
with vanishing messages.5 Apps for “exploding” 
communications are appearing one after another, showing no 
signs of slowing down.6 
The proliferation of these services demonstrates a shift 
in how we wish to connect with one another, and more 
importantly, the trail we leave behind in doing so.7 For 
parties involved in litigation, there is reason to be mindful of 
social media. One study found eighty-one percent of surveyed 
matrimonial attorneys had discovered and used social 
networking evidence in cases.8 Attorneys in products 
liability, personal injury, criminal, employment, intellectual 
property, defamation, insurance, and securities litigation 
have all reported finding crucial case information on social 
media sites.9 Across the country, courts have made 
preservation rulings on cases in which Facebook users have 
strengthened profile privacy settings, changed default profile 
pictures, deleted wall posts, deactivated accounts, and even 
sent taunting messages to opposing counsel.10 Additionally, 
one survey found fifty-seven percent of all application users 
  
figure rose to $10 billion after being valuated at an estimated $4 billion less than 
one year earlier. Evelyn M. Rusli & Douglas MacMillan, Snapchat Mulls Raising 
Money at $3 to $4 Billion Valuation, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/10/25/snapchat-mulls-raising-money-at-3-4-
billion-valuation. 
 4. Nicole A. Poltash, Comment, Snapchat and Sexting: A Snapshot of Baring 
Your Bare Essentials, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, ¶ 16 (2013). 
 5. See Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 307. 
 6. See id. at 306-07; see, e.g., Jay Yarow, There’s A New App That Lets People 
Send Self Destructing Messages. It Wants To Be Snapchat For Professionals, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 8, 2014, 10:47 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
confide-a-snapchat-for-professionals-2014-1. 
 7. See Woodrow Hartzog, The Second Wave of Global Privacy Protection: 
Social Data, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 995, 1016-17 (2013). 
 8. John G. Browning, Digging for Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evidence 
from Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 465, 467 (2011).  
 9. Id. 
 10. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 285-86, 291-305.  
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have installed, uninstalled, or declined to install an “app” due 
to privacy concerns.11 
The tipping point may have been recent revelations 
about the National Security Agency (NSA) and its domestic 
surveillance operations.12 Whistleblower Edward Snowden 
revealed that the NSA conducts highly invasive surveillance 
on American citizens and others, collecting more personal 
and private information than the public knew.13 The outcry 
was monumental, as the extent of the United States’ privacy-
unfriendly exploits was previously undisclosed.14 As one 
author poignantly stated, “[t]hat was then: we are all on 
notice now.”15 
Given this background, it is not difficult to see why self-
destructing communication technologies have spiked and 
made it “easier for a person’s bad decisions to vanish into thin 
air.”16 One author writes that “Snapchat’s self-destructing 
messages make users feel immune from repercussions.”17 A 
study found that seventy-seven percent of college students 
use Snapchat once per day.18 As of October 2014, Snapchat 
  
 11. Gillette, supra note 1. 
 12. See A. Michael Froomkin, “PETs Must Be on a Leash”: How U.S. Law (and 
Industry Practice) Often Undermines and Even Forbids Valuable Privacy 
Enhancing Technology, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 965, 978-79 (2013). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See id; see also Heather Kelly, Protests against the NSA spring up across 
U.S., CNN (July 5, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/04/tech/web/restore-nsa-
protests; Bart Jansen & Carolyn Pesce, Anti-NSA rally attracts thousands to 
march in Washington, U.S.A. TODAY (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2013/10/26/nsa-dc-rally/3241417. 
 15. Froomkin, supra note 12, at 994. 
 16. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 306.  
 17. Poltash, supra note 4, ¶ 38. Poltash's article is the only article to date 
written exclusively about Snapchat’s relation to the law, specifically regarding 
sexting. Accordingly, it has been cited frequently, including reference in several 
Virginia statutes. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.7:1, 18.2-216.1, 18.2-390, 
22.1-70.2, 22.1-279.6, 42.1-36.1. 
 18. See Kurt Wagner, Study Finds 77% of College Students Use Snapchat 
Daily, MASHABLE (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.mashable.com/2014/02/24/
snapchat-study-college-students. 
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users were sending 700 million images per day.19 
Vaporstream’s website boasts that its clandestine 
communications are “no different than talking face-to-face 
over lunch or at the water cooler.”20 Other apps such as Wickr, 
Gryphn, TigerText, Burn Note, and Ansa use encryption to 
send self-destructing texts, videos, images, and documents.21 
On January 8, 2014, as this Comment was being written, a 
new app was unveiled called Confide; its founders touted it 
as the “professional counterpoint to Snapchat.”22 On January 
24, 2014, another Snapchat-like app appeared called Secret 
Square, founded by a Vaporstream executive.23 On May 13, 
2014, Yahoo purchased a self-destructing mobile messaging 
startup named Blink for an undisclosed amount.24 Paired 
with Facebook’s highly publicized failure to acquire 
Snapchat―twice25―it is clear the big players in the tech 
  
 19. Saitto, supra note 3. This figure has doubled since October 2013, when 
users were sending 350 million images per day. Micah Schaffer, Who Can View 
My Snaps and Stories, SNAPCHAT BLOG (Oct. 14, 2013, 11:23 AM), 
http://blog.snapchat.com/post/64036804085/who-can-view-my-snaps-and-stories. 
 20. FAQ, VAPORSTREAM, https://www.benegourmet.com/faq (last visited Sept. 
29, 2014) [hereinafter Vaporstream FAQ] (copies on file with Buffalo Law 
Review). Sometime after this Comment was written in early 2014, Vaporstream 
changed its entire website and, curiously, removed nearly all of the controversial 
language cited throughout this Comment. The website cited above preserved the 
older version of the website. Compare Vaporstream FAQ, supra, with FAQ, 
VAPORSTREAM, https://www.vaporstream.com/faq (last visited Sept. 29, 2014). 
 21. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 306-07; Belinda Luscombe, 
TigerText: An iPhone App for Cheating Spouses?, TIME (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1968233,00.html; Burning 
Questions: Privacy Info From Burn Note, BURN NOTE, http://info.
burnnote.com/about (last visited Feb. 6, 2014) [hereinafter Burning Questions].  
 22. Yarow, supra note 6.  
 23. Edward Cox, Northwestern alum creates Snapchat-like app, DAILY 
NORTHWESTERN (Jan. 26, 2014), http://dailynorthwestern.com/2014/01/26/
campus/northwestern-alum-creates-snapchat-like-app. 
 24. Benjamin Horney, Yahoo Buys Self-Destruct Mobile Messaging App Blink, 
LAW360 (May 14, 2014. 1:18, PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/537699/yahoo-
buys-self-destruct-mobile-messaging-app-blink.  
 25. First, Snapchat CEO Evan Spiegel declined a $1 billion offer from Facebook 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg, as Snapchat valued its worth at closer to $3 to $4 billion. 
See Rusli & MacMillan, supra note 3 and accompanying text. Then, when 
Zuckerberg offered Spiegel $3 billion, Spiegel rebuffed that as well, reportedly 
infuriating Zuckerberg. See Seth Fiegerman, Snapchat CEO Reveals Why He 
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market want to venture into this field. The futuristic 1960s 
Mission: Impossible messages that would “self-destruct in 
five seconds” have not only become a reality, but are now in 
exceedingly high demand.26 
In fact, the demand has become so great that almighty 
Apple is integrating ephemeral technology into its products. 
In unveiling the newest iPhone operating system, iOS 8, 
Apple announced that all audio, photo, and video iMessages27 
will vanish unless users change the settings.28 Users can 
choose self-destruct settings just like Snapchat.29 Further, 
Apple redesigned its messaging and camera interfaces to 
compete with the easy use of Snapchat.30 Apple marketed the 
feature as a means of saving phone memory, but many view 
this as “clearly an assault on Snapchat.”31 Regardless of the 
motive, hundreds of millions of iPhone users worldwide will 
all soon have an ephemeral data device in their pockets―a 
tool for “selfie-destruction”―and they will not have to go to 
the AppStore32 to get it. 
  
Rejected Facebook’s $3 Billion Offer, MASHABLE (Jan. 6, 2014), 
http://mashable.com/2014/01/06/snapchat-facebook-acquisition-2; Evelyn M. 
Rusli & Douglas MacMillan, Snapchat Spurned $3 Billion Acquisition Offer from 
Facebook, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Nov. 13, 2013, 1:43 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/11/13/snapchat-spurned-3-billion-acquisition-
offer-from-facebook. Thereafter, Zuckerberg even attempted to “crush” Snapchat 
by releasing a similar app called Poke, which failed embarrassingly. See 
Fiegerman, supra; see also Mark Milian, Zuckerberg's Snapchat Envy Isn't 
Disappearing, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-08-14/zuckerberg-s-snapchat-envy-isn-t-disappearing.html. 
 26. See Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 308. 
 27. iMessages are communications sent between one or more iMessage-
enabled iPhones. Apple’s new ephemeral technology will apply only to these 
messages. Jacob Kleinman, Apple Takes on Snapchat with Self-Destructing 
Messages in iOS 8, TECHNOBUFFALO (June 2, 2014), http://www.technobuffalo.com
/2014/06/02/apple-takes-on-snapchat-with-self-destructing-messages-in-ios-8. 
 28. Brandon Griggs, Big Changes Coming to iPhone Messaging, CNN (June 3, 
2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/03/tech/mobile/apple-messages-app/index.
html?hpt=hp_t2; Kleinman, supra note 27. 
 29. See Kleinman, supra note 27. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. The AppStore is Apple’s highly regulated smartphone application 
marketplace, where users can download apps like Snapchat, Wickr, and the like. 
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The downside of such growth, however, is the propensity 
for such services to be used for illegal activity.33 Some sign up 
for ephemeral data apps because they know preserved data 
would be a problem as they go about their dirty deeds. That 
incriminating “selfie”34 you took? Good thing you used 
Snapchat.35 That insider trading tip you sent? Thank God for 
Vaporstream.36 
As is often the case, the law is lagging behind these 
advancements in technology.37 While the applicable Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have been amended to keep up with 
some technological developments, the old rules never 
contemplated a situation in which, by design, discoverable 
information could disappear without a trace. This is unlike 
standard spoliation, where parties destroy evidence 
themselves.38 This is different than merely deleting a 
discoverable Facebook post.39 Here, evidence destroys itself 
because the party chooses a self-destroying data program to 
communicate.40  
So what happens when you bring together an antiquated 
set of rules designed to preserve evidence for parties, and 
applications designed to eradicate evidence for their 
opponents? Could mere use of Snapchat or Vaporstream 
constitute spoliation? These issues become even more 
complex with the latest wrinkles in Snapchat’s software. 
While Snapchat recipients have always been able to 
screenshot an image in order to preserve it, now users have 
  
 33. See Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 308; Poltash, supra 
note 4, ¶¶ 21-22. 
 34. A “selfie” is a photograph one takes of oneself. The explosion of social media 
caused usage of the new term to skyrocket, earning it a place in the dictionary 
and the honor of being 2013 Oxford Word of the Year. See Ben Brumfield, Selfie 
named word of the year for 2013, CNN (Nov. 20, 2013, 12:29 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/19/living/selfie-word-of-the-year. 
 35. See Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 306. 
 36. Id. at 307-08.  
 37. Id. at 308. 
 38. See id. at 274-75. 
 39. See id. at 295-97. 
 40. See id. at 275. 
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the power to save Snaps before sending them, as well as the 
ability to replay one received Snap per day.41 These changes 
may alleviate some preservation issues associated with 
Snapchat. However, no cases have yet dealt with Snapchat, 
Vaporstream, or other self-destroying messaging apps. 
Further complicating matters, what if ephemeral 
messages never truly disappear? Snapchat claims that once 
a Snap is viewed, it is deleted from Snapchat servers and 
recipient devices.42 However, when Android users found ways 
to access old Snaps, the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center (EPIC) filed a complaint to the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) for deceptive business practices, 
criticizing Snapchat’s false promises of true ephemerality.43 
Further, an app called Snaphack allegedly allows users to 
view old Snaps.44 Would this change the debate? Does it 
matter that the sender intended for the content to never be 
seen again? Additionally, new technology often faces security 
risks, a problem that may be even worse for ephemeral media 
because of its deliberately disappearing nature.45 
This Comment bridges the gap between preservation of 
evidence and data that are not meant to be preserved. While 
one article has addressed preservation issues with deleted 
social media posts generally46 and some case law has dealt 
  
 41. Snapchat Privacy Policy, http://www.snapchat.com/privacy (last updated 
May 1, 2014).  
 42. Id. 
 43. See Joyce E. Cutler, Privacy Group Asks FTC to Investigate Snapchat’s 
Claims Regarding Photo Deletion, BLOOMBERG BNA SOC. MEDIA LAW & POL. REP., 
May 21, 2013 [hereinafter Cutler, Privacy Group]. 
 44. Kalyani M., Snaphack App Lets You Save Snapchats Without Notifying the 
Sender, SPIDEROAK BLOG, https://spideroak.com/privacypost/cloud-security/
snaphack-app-lets-you-save-snapchats-without-notifing-the-sender (Nov. 21, 
2013). 
 45. It stands to reason that if a person deliberately chooses a self-destructing 
communication medium, the person does not want the message to be seen by 
others—which suggests an outsider may be more likely to want access to such 
forbidden content. 
 46. See Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1. 
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with preserving certain types of temporary data,47 no article 
or case has yet discussed the discovery consequences of 
ephemeral technologies such as Snapchat and Vaporstream. 
This Comment attempts to resolve the application of older 
legal discovery concepts to novel self-destroying technologies.  
Part I explains the history of ephemeral communication 
applications such as Snapchat and Vaporstream and how the 
programs work. Part II details preservation and spoliation in 
electronic discovery, including current rules and 
interpretations. Part III shows the conflicts between 
preservation rules and self-destructing data, as well as where 
problems might arise in civil litigation.48 Part IV offers an 
outlook on how courts should use the Federal Rules to assess 
this evidence and other potential remedies. 
I. BACKGROUND ON SELF-DESTRUCTING DATA APPLICATIONS 
A.  Snapchat 
Snapchat was created in a fraternity house by Stanford 
students Evan Spiegel and Bobby Murphy in April 2011.49 
The two were inspired after hearing stories of social media 
crises such as emergency untagging of compromising 
Facebook photos before job interviews.50 Snapchat was 
launched in Apple’s AppStore in September of 2011.51 By 
October 2014, app users were sending 700 million Snaps per 
day.52 The program is particularly popular among 
smartphone users under twenty-five;53 seventy-seven percent 
  
 47. See SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 63 (2009).  
 48. This Comment primarily addresses ephemeral data issues that arise 
during litigation. For a brief analysis of pre-litigation ephemeral data problems, 
see id. at 233-35. 
 49. Poltash, supra note 4, ¶ 10; Evan Spiegel, Let’s Chat., SNAPCHAT BLOG (May 
9, 2012, 7:11 PM), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/22756675666/lets-chat. 
 50. Spiegel, supra note 49. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Saitto, supra note 3.  
 53. Poltash, supra note 4, ¶ 16. 
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of college students use the app at least once per day.54 
From the beginning, Snapchat’s creators emphasized the 
value of ephemeral social media.55 Snapchat researcher 
Nathan Jurgenson has written several blog posts about 
ephemerality, stressing that permanent content is merely 
“one option.”56 Jurgenson argues that life is a flow of ever-
changing events, and not all of them are meant to be 
“captured, preserved, and put behind glass” like a Facebook 
profile.57 He states permanent social media fixates on a photo, 
while temporary social media focuses on what it meant and 
how you felt, which more closely mimics the fluidity of life 
itself.58 Jurgenson poignantly concludes, “[t]he Web doesn’t 
mean the end of forgetting; indeed, it has demanded it.”59 
Evan Spiegel, CEO of Snapchat, discussed ephemerality 
and the changing nature of social media in a January 2014 
keynote address:  
The selfie makes sense as the fundamental unit of communication 
on Snapchat because it marks the transition between digital media 
as self-expression and digital media as communication. And this 
brings us to the importance of ephemerality at the core of 
conversation. . . . Snapchat sets expectations around conversation 
that mirror the expectations we have when we’re talking in-
person.60 
The way Snapchat works is simple. Once a user 
downloads the app and registers a username, the user can 
allow Snapchat to access phone numbers, easily letting 
  
 54. Wagner, supra note 18. 
 55. Team Snapchat, Snapchat Turns 1 Today!, SNAPCHAT (Sep. 26, 2012, 1:50 
PM), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/32347694051/snapchat-turns-1-today. 
 56. Nathan Jurgenson, The Liquid Self, SNAPCHAT BLOG (Sep. 20, 2013, 10:38 
AM), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/61770468323/the-liquid-self. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Nathan Jurgenson, Temporary Social Media, SNAPCHAT BLOG (July 19, 
2013, 2:43 PM), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/55902851023/temporary-social-
media. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Evan Spiegel, 2014 AXS Partner Summit Keynote, SNAPCHAT BLOG (Jan. 
27, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/74745418745/2014-axs-
partner-summit-keynote. 
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friends become Snapchat contacts.61 When a user takes a 
photo, the user can type a line of text over the photo, draw on 
the photo, and apply various filters.62 A user chooses exactly 
which contacts the user wishes to send the Snap to, and the 
sender can allow the photo to be viewed for one to ten 
seconds.63 When a user shoots a video of one to ten seconds, 
all of the same features apply.64 When a person receives a 
Snap, it appears in the Snapchat log, and the recipient 
touches the message entry and holds a finger down on the 
touchscreen to view. 
The key component of the application is self-deletion.65 
The content is stored in a temporary folder in a smartphone’s 
memory files.66 This can either occur in internal memory, 
Random Access Memory (RAM), or external memory.67 Once 
a Snap is viewed, the sender can see that the message was 
viewed, and the temporary copy is deleted from the 
recipient’s phone.68 The content is also sent to Snapchat 
servers, and once it has been viewed by all recipients, it is 
deleted from the servers.69 An unopened Snap remains on 
servers for thirty days, at which point it is deleted.70 The only 
record that remains is the Snapchat log, which looks like a 
phone record. The log of fifty71 entries details who you sent a 
  
 61. Poltash, supra note 4, ¶ 11. 
 62. Id. ¶ 12. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. See Team Snapchat, How Snaps Are Stored And Deleted, SNAPCHAT BLOG 
(May 9, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://blog.snapchat.com/post/50060403002/how-snaps-
are-stored-and-deleted. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. While user devices have a log of the last fifty Snaps, Snapchat servers 
retain a log of the last two hundred Snaps that have been sent and received. 
Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, SNAPCHAT, https://info.publicintelligence.net/
SnapchatLawEnforcementGuide.pdf (last updated Dec. 1, 2012). 
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Snap to (or who sent you one), the time, and message status 
(sent, delivered, or opened). 
While the purpose of Snapchat is to send content that 
disappears, photos and videos now have various ways to be 
saved. When a user creates content, there is a “save” icon that 
will preserve the content on the user’s phone. A user can also 
choose to add the content to “My Story,” which permits 
friends to view the Snap an unlimited number of times for 
twenty-four hours. A recipient can screenshot the Snap, 
which will notify the sender. A new “replay” feature permits 
a recipient to replay any one Snap per day, which will also 
notify the sender.72 
Snapchat expanded its features even further on May 1, 
2014. Users can now send text messages through the app, 
which disappear when both users exit the screen.73 
Screenshots of this content are permitted and will alert the 
other user, just as photo screenshots do.74 Further, Snapchat 
users can utilize two-way and one-way live video chatting 
through the app.75 These features provide a tremendous boost 
in functionality for the increasingly popular app.76 
However, Snapchat is far from foolproof. As mentioned 
earlier, a digital forensics firm found a way to re-access 
Snaps on Android phones at later times, despite claims by 
Snapchat that the content disappears from the phone.77 The 
  
 72. Snapchat has not elaborated on how the “replay” feature reconciles with its 
promises to delete Snaps from servers and devices immediately after being 
viewed. When a person finishes viewing a Snap, the option to replay it appears. 
When you choose to replay, the app informs you that this is a once-per-day 
feature, then reloads the Snap. However, replay must occur before leaving the 
application; if you view a Snap and close the application, replay is not available 
when you return.  
 73. Stan Schroeder, Snapchat Adds Video Chat, Instant Messaging, MASHABLE 
(May 1, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/05/01/snapchat-adds-video-chat-
instant-messaging. This is a similar feature to what Apple unveiled for its 
upcoming iOS 8. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 74. Schroeder, supra note 73. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. 
 77. Snapchat Unveiled: An Examination of Snapchat on Android Devices, 
DECIPHER FORENSICS (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.decipherforensics.com/snapchat. 
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study concluded that metadata are stored for expired and 
unexpired Snapchat images, and that the images do not 
disappear forever as Snapchat claims.78 EPIC filed a formal 
investigation request to the FTC, alleging deceptive business 
practices and asking the FTC to force Snapchat to improve 
its data security practices.79 This warning rang true months 
later, when 4.6 million Snapchat usernames and phone 
numbers were leaked online by a company whose stated 
purpose was to wake up Snapchat and the public to its 
security vulnerabilities.80 Subsequently, EPIC renewed its 
FTC complaint, faulting both Snapchat’s security weakness 
and the FTC’s inaction since EPIC’s initial filing.81 While 
Snapchat says it takes “reasonable measures” to ensure 
security,82 no security measures have been taken since the 
breach, other than the announcement of a minor app 
update.83 Snapchat eventually settled with the FTC over 
EPIC’s complaint; Snapchat will be prohibited from 
misrepresenting the extent to which it maintains privacy, 
security, and confidentiality of user information.84 The 
  
 78. Id. 
 79. Cutler, Privacy Group, supra note 43. 
 80. Joyce E. Cutler, Snapchat Announces Security Update Responding to 
Online Posting of User Info, BLOOMBERG BNA ELEC. COM. & LAW REP. (Jan. 8, 
2014) [hereinafter Cutler, Security Update]; Chris Ziegler, Alleged Snapchat 
Hackers Explain How and Why They Leaked Data on 4.6 Million Accounts, THE 
VERGE (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/1/5263156/alleged-
snapchat-hackers-explain-how-and-why-they-leaked-data-on-accounts.  
 81. Id. To date, the FTC has still not responded to EPIC’s complaint, other 
than to say it has been received. Id. 
 82. Snapchat Privacy Policy, supra note 41. It is worth noting that, despite its 
highly publicized security issues, Snapchat’s privacy policy has exactly one 
sentence in its “Security” section, its terms of use has one paragraph in its 
“Account Security” section (which only focuses on what users should not do), and 
not a single blog post is about security. Id.; Snapchat Terms of Use, 
https://www.snapchat.com/terms (last updated Dec. 20, 2013). 
 83. See Cutler, Security Update, supra note 80. 
 84. Juan Carlos Rodriguez, EPIC Pushes FTC For Stronger Snapchat Privacy 
Pact, LAW360 (June 11, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/547075/epic-
pushes-ftc-for-stronger-snapchat-privacy-pact. EPIC thought the deal did not go 
far enough, continuing its aggressive campaign against companies with privacy 
shortcomings. Id.; see Allison Grande, FTC Steps Up Privacy Enforcement, With 
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company must also implement a comprehensive privacy 
program to be monitored for the next twenty years.85 A 
similar settlement was reached with the Maryland Attorney 
General in a state action against Snapchat for privacy 
shortcomings.86 
According to its privacy policy, Snapchat gathers other 
information from users.87 Snapchat may collect a username, 
password, email address, phone number, age, and any other 
information the user chooses to provide.88 Snapchat also 
gathers information about usage, logs, devices, location, 
cookies, and other tracking technologies.89 The company 
claims to use this information for service improvement, 
software updates, trend analyses, and other incidental 
purposes.90 Snapchat states it may share such information 
“[i]n response to legal process or a request for information if 
we believe disclosure is in accordance with any applicable 
law, rule, or regulation.”91  
The purposes for Snapchat continue to grow. Some users 
document exciting or humorous moments during their day, 
while others send nearly every mundane moment of their day, 
from eating cereal to working out. High school students use 
the app during lectures to talk to classmates without 
teachers knowing. Some use it for more nefarious purposes, 
such as cheating on tests, sexting, sending crude drawings, 
and flaunting underage drinking.92 The supposed 
  
No Slowdown In Sight; LAW360 (July 23, 2014), http://www.law360.com/
articles/559907/ftc-steps-up-privacy-enforcement-with-no-slowdown-in-sight. 
 85. Rodriguez, supra note 84. 
 86. Marlisse Silver Sweeney, Snapchat Settles With Maryland Attorney 
General, LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS (July 10, 2014), 
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202662825225/Snapchat-Settles-With-
Maryland-Attorney-General-?slreturn=20150007202538. 
 87. Snapchat Privacy Policy, supra note 41. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Poltash, supra note 4, ¶¶ 19, 22. 
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inconsequentiality of Snaps makes it easy for these more 
immoral uses to be carried out.93 
B.  Vaporstream 
While Snapchat reigns supreme in younger 
demographics, Vaporstream has attracted attention in the 
professional world for its own vanishing communications.94 
The startup was unveiled in 2006 by Void Communications 
LLC as a complement to email and instant messaging, both 
of which leave abundant records.95 Originally, the service was 
not dependent on businesses, and a subscription cost just $40 
per individual per year.96 Now, Vaporstream markets a 
premium service for companies, which carries a hefty price 
tag of up to $25,000 per month for fifty employees.97 The 
service was originally designed so that subscribers could only 
contact other subscribers; now, members may contact non-
subscribers, such as an attorney communicating privileged 
information with a client.98 
Vaporstream aims to bring the security of a face-to-face 
conversation to the world of instant communications.99 The 
company notes a trade-off between privacy and velocity: the 
most secure communications are phone and face-to-face 
conversations that must be scheduled in advance, while 
emails, texts, and instant messages can be sent and received 
  
 93. See id. ¶¶ 18-22. 
 94. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 307. 
 95. Brian Bergstein, Messages that go ‘poof’ after sending them, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Sept. 24, 2006, 9:40 PM). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 307. 
 98. Jason Krause, Vaporstream’s Disappearing E-mail Act, N.J. L.J., Apr. 25, 
2011, at 3. 
 99. See Why Vaporstream, VAPORSTREAM, https://www.benegourmet.com/why-
vaporstream (last visited Sept. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Why Vaporstream] (copies 
on file with Buffalo Law Review). As mentioned earlier, Vaporstream changed its 
website after this Comment was written. See supra note 20; compare Why 
Vaporstream, supra, with Why Vaporstream, VAPORSTREAM, 
https://www.vaporstream.com/why_vaporstream (last visited Sept. 29, 2014). 
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instantly, but run the risk of being recorded and discovered.100 
Vaporstream purports to unite security and speed; in its own 
trademarked words, “It’s safe to hit send again.”101 The site 
also promotes itself as the best way to steer clear of “an 
avoidable eDiscovery event,” as Vaporstream allegedly does 
not create Electronically Stored Information (ESI).102 
When a user sends a message via Vaporstream, the 
message instantly disappears from the sender’s device.103 
Once a recipient opens the message, it vanishes from that 
device as well.104 When a user checks the Vaporstream page, 
the user can see that a person has sent him a message, but 
once the recipient opens it, the name disappears and only the 
message is shown.105 Vaporstream also stresses that its 
transmissions “cannot be intercepted, copied, forwarded, 
printed, stored or even traced.”106  
Vaporstream differs from Snapchat in a few important 
ways. Vaporstream says it does not create ESI or a digital 
footprint.107 The content is strictly peer-to-peer, meaning it is 
never stored on an intermediate server.108 Instead, it is stored 
in video RAM, which is highly volatile and constantly being 
overwritten with new data.109 Screenshots tying content to 
one person are impossible because the sender’s name and 
  
 100. Why Vaporstream, supra note 99. 
 101. Home Page, VAPORSTREAM, https://www.benegourmet.com (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Vaporstream Home Page] (copies on file with Buffalo 
Law Review). As mentioned earlier, Vaporstream changed its website after this 
Comment was written. See supra note 20; compare Vaporstream Home Page, 
supra, with Home Page, VAPORSTREAM, https://www.vaporstream.com (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2014). 
 102. Vaporstream FAQ, supra note 20. 
 103. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 307. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Bergstein, supra note 95. 
 106. Vaporstream FAQ, supra note 20. 
 107. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 307; Vaporstream FAQ, 
supra note 20. 
 108. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 307. 
 109. Krause, supra note 98, at 3. 
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message never appear on screen at the same time.110 Further, 
because a Vaporstream message is never stored on a server 
like Snaps are, the encrypted messages cannot be 
intercepted.111 Vaporstream messages cannot be replayed or 
saved after viewing.112 However, the company recently 
announced a new module called VaporIGM, which saves only 
transitory messages that some organizations may need to 
comply with internal audit policies, legal holds, or SEC 
regulations.113 Finally, former CEO Jason Howe said 
Vaporstream is an enterprise application, whereas Snapchat 
is a consumer application,114 which may also impact its 
evidentiary treatment. 
C.  Other Ephemeral Communication Programs 
Snapchat and Vaporstream are not alone in the new 
market of self-destroying data technologies. Wickr uses 
military-grade encryption to send text, video, voice, and 
document files that self-destruct after a set period of time.115 
Gryphn serves as an encryption tool for communications and 
makes it difficult to capture the information via screenshot.116 
Ansa, marketed to “those prone to drunk texting,” deletes 
media from the sender’s device, recipient’s device, and Ansa 
servers seconds after being read.117 Burn Note provides self-
destructing email through computer software and mobile 
apps.118 TigerText, allegedly inspired by the publicized 
  
 110. Vaporstream FAQ, supra note 20. 
 111. David Hechler, Electronic Messages that Vanish Without a Trace, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (Apr. 22, 2013). 
 112. Vaporstream FAQ, supra note 20. 
 113. Vaporstream Announces New Governance Product at LegalTech: Streaming 
E-Communications Platform Facilitates Transitory Messaging, P.R. NEWSWIRE, 
Feb. 4, 2014, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
vaporstream-announces-new-governance-product-at-legaltech-243497291.html. 
 114. Hechler, supra note 111. 
 115. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 306. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 306-07. 
 118. Burning Questions, supra note 21. 
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infidelity of Tiger Woods,119 stores content on the application’s 
servers instead of on a recipient’s phone.120 The sender can 
specify a time period between one minute and five days before 
deletion.121 Time Magazine referred to it as an “iPhone App 
for Cheating Spouses.”122  
Fittingly, two self-destructing data applications were 
unveiled as this Comment was being written. Confide, 
released on January 8, 2014, aims to be “Snapchat for 
professionals.”123 The app discourages screenshots in the 
same way Vaporstream does—the sender’s name and the 
content are never on the same screen at the same time.124 
Confide differs from Snapchat in that it relies on email 
addresses rather than phone numbers.125 Secret Square, 
founded by Vaporstream executive Steve Tarzia, was 
unveiled on January 24, 2014 for “protecting your future self” 
by destroying messages after two minutes.126 Tarzia said the 
app was conceived out of the growing public awareness of 
NSA data-mining activities.127 Furthermore, the 
aforementioned iOS 8 makeover for iPhones was announced 
in June 2014.128 
Ephemeral data appears to be here to stay. One author 
commented that such applications “inherently demonstrate 
that disclosures lose their primary utility as social data as 
  
 119. Yarow, supra note 6. 
 120. Adam M. Gershowitz, Seizing a Cell Phone Incident to Arrest: Data 
Extraction Devices, Faraday Bags, or Aluminum Foil as a Solution to the 
Warrantless Cell Phone Search Problem, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 601, 608 
(2013). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Luscombe, supra note 21. 
 123. Yarow, supra note 6. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Aldrin Calimlim, Confide In Your Friends Off The Record With This New 
Ephemeral Messaging App, APPADVICE (Jan. 9, 2014), http://appadvice.com/
appnn/2014/01/confide-in-your-friends-off-the-record-with-this-new-ephemeral-
messaging-app. 
 126. Cox, supra note 23. 
 127. Id.; see also supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. 
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time passes.”129 The surge in self-destroying data applications 
for personal and professional purposes demonstrates the 
uptick in the demand for and desirability of ephemeral 
media. However, the legal world is still unsure which rules 
to apply to these applications and how to apply them. Part II 
looks at the Federal Rules to pinpoint the relevant laws to 
apply to ephemeral communications. 
II. RULES OF PRESERVATION AND SPOLIATION 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 
2006 to establish a distinct category of evidence: 
Electronically Stored Information (ESI).130 Anticipating an 
increase in computer usage, the change addressed issues 
related to preserving, disclosing, and seeking ESI.131 At that 
time, however, “social networking was in its infancy and its 
paradigm-shifting impact on how people communicate and 
share information was yet to be felt.”132 Accordingly, 
preservation of such evidence has become a hotly debated 
topic in the legal community.133 This Part examines the legal 
framework of the duty to preserve and spoliation.  
A.  Language of Applicable Federal Rules 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) states that 
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense” and 
that “[f]or good cause, the court may order discovery of any 
  
 129. Hartzog, supra note 7, at 1017. This notion is not limited to self-destroying 
data applications. The European Union is considering creation of a sweeping, 
controversial privacy right—the “right to be forgotten.” Meg Leta Ambrose, A 
Digital Dark Age and the Right to Be Forgotten, J. INTERNET L., Sept. 2013, at 1, 
8. The proposed regulation would give persons the right to force erasure of their 
personal data from the Internet under certain circumstances. Id. at 10. 
Proponents argue for one’s right to silence a particularly unsettling past and move 
forward. Id. at 11. Critics call it “rewriting history.” Id. 
 130. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 2. 
 131. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 274; see FED. R. CIV. P. 26 
advisory committee’s note (2006).  
 132. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 274. 
 133. See id. 
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matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
action.”134 Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) also states courts must limit 
discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit.”135 Rule 34(a) provides for the 
discovery of ESI “stored in any medium” in a “reasonably 
usable form,” a broad approach designed to encompass future 
technological advancements.136 Rule 34(b)(1)(C) permits a 
party to specify the form of the ESI,137 while Rule 
34(b)(2)(E)(ii) mandates ESI must be produced in a form “in 
which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable 
form.”138 Such evidence must be in the responding party’s 
possession, custody, or control, or that party must have the 
legal right to obtain the documents on demand.139  
While Rule 26(b)(2)(B) states that a party need not 
produce ESI from sources that are not reasonably accessible, 
a showing of good cause can compel discovery of this ESI.140 
Factors for courts to consider include: (1) specificity of the 
discovery request; (2) quantity of information available from 
other, more easily accessed sources; (3) failure to provide 
relevant information that once existed but is no longer easily 
accessible; (4) likelihood of finding relevant information that 
cannot be obtained from more accessible sources; (5) 
predictions as to the usefulness of further information; (6) 
importance of the issues at stake; and (7) each party’s 
resources.141 
  
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 135. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 136. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A); FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note 
(2006). 
 137. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C). 
 138. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-
1093 FMC(JCx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007), at *24-
25. For elaboration on the meaning of possession, custody, and control, see 
SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 82-97. 
 140. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note 
(2006). 
 141. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
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B.  The Duty to Preserve 
An obligation to preserve evidence arises when a party 
has notice that the information will be relevant to litigation 
or when the party should have known it would be relevant to 
future litigation.142 This may arise from common law, 
statutes, regulations, or court orders.143 Determining when a 
party reasonably should have anticipated litigation can be a 
challenge for courts.144 Typically, the determination is based 
on good faith and a reasonable evaluation of the facts and 
circumstances.145 Further, the future litigation must be 
probable, not just possible.146 However, a plaintiff’s duty to 
preserve is viewed differently than a defendant’s because 
plaintiffs control when litigation begins and, therefore, 
necessarily anticipate it.147 Without a court order, the 
obligation to preserve is generally not extended to non-
parties with knowledge of pending or future litigation, due 
primarily to the costly endeavor of preserving ESI.148 
Courts struggle with exactly which kinds of ESI are 
covered by the duty to preserve.149 The analysis begins with 
the presumption that all relevant ESI should be preserved.150 
Factors such as the degree of accessibility and costs to 
preserve may impact a preservation obligation.151 However, 
the Federal Rules indicate that “mere . . . inaccessibility” does 
not automatically “relieve a party of its preservation 
obligation.”152 Further, some courts have held a duty to 
  
 142. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 36. 
 143. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 144. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 46. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 47. 
 147. Id. at 48. 
 148. See id. at 38-39. 
 149. See id. at 53-55. 
 150. See id. at 54 (citing Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 151. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 56-57. 
 152. Id. at 56. Not all courts agree with this interpretation of the Federal Rules. 
Id. 
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preserve does not impart a duty to keep the data in an 
accessible format, particularly when doing so would be 
costly.153 This guideline is accompanied by a standard of 
reasonableness under the circumstances, as courts do not 
require parties to “preserve every shred of paper, every e-
mail or electronic document, and every back-up tape.”154 
Parties typically receive a presumption of adequate 
preservation if they act thoughtfully, reasonably, and in good 
faith to preserve or attempt to preserve information for 
litigation.155 
A duty to preserve also arises from properly tailored 
preservation orders.156 The requesting party has the burden 
of demonstrating potential irreparable injury of destroyed 
evidence.157 The court in Columbia Pictures Industries v. 
Bunnell158 articulated a three-part balancing test for issuing 
a preservation order. Courts should consider: (1) the level of 
concern the court has for continuing existence and integrity 
of the evidence without a preservation order; (2) any 
irreparable harm likely to result to the party seeking 
preservation; and (3) the capability of the party to maintain 
the evidence, including the original form, condition, and 
contents, as well as burdens associated with maintaining 
such evidence.159 In 2006, the Conference of Chief Justices 
articulated four similar factors for courts to consider when an 
order to preserve ESI is sought.160 Once there is a threshold 
  
 153. See Best Buy Stores L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 247 F.R.D. 
567, 570-71 (D. Minn. 2007); Quinby v. WestLB AG, No. 04 Civ.7406 (WHP) 
(HBP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35583, at *27 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2005). 
 154. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217.  
 155. See Carla Walworth et al., Mobile Business Communications May Result in 
Litigation Risk, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2013, at S2, S11. 
 156. See SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 78-80. 
 157. See id. at 79. Again, not all courts agree with this approach. See id. 
 158. No. CV 06-1093 FMC(JCx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364, at *28-29 (C.D. 
Cal. May 29, 2007). 
 159. Id. at *28-29 (citing Capricorn Power Co. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power 
Co., 220 F.R.D. 429, 433-34 (W.D. Pa. 2004)). 
 160. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, GUIDELINES FOR STATE TRIAL COURTS 
REGARDING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY-STORED INFORMATION 9-10 (2006), 
available at http://cdm15574.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/civil/id/56. 
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showing that the integrity of the ESI is threatened, courts 
should consider: (1) the nature of the threat; (2) the potential 
for irreparable harm to the requesting party; (3) the 
capability of the responding party to maintain the ESI in its 
original form, condition, and content; and (4) any physical, 
technological, or financial burdens created by ordering 
preservation.161 
C.  Spoliation 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 governs when a court 
may impose sanctions for destruction of evidence.162 First, 
three elements are common to all spoliation claims: (1) a duty 
to preserve must have attached before evidence was 
destroyed; (2) the accused party must have acted with a 
culpable state of mind163; and (3) the other party must have 
been prejudiced by the destruction of evidence.164 Courts may 
also consider factors such as: (1) the degree of interference 
with the judicial process; (2) whether lesser sanctions will 
properly remedy the harm; (3) whether sanctions are 
necessary for deterrence purposes; and (4) whether a party 
will be unfairly punished for spoliation caused by an 
attorney.165  
Courts may issue a variety of penalties for spoliation.166 
Courts may hold violators in contempt, dismiss a case,167 
render a default judgment, issue an adverse jury instruction, 
prohibit the party from making certain claims or defenses, 
bar admission of a piece of evidence, strike pleadings, stay 
proceedings until the party complies, or order monetary 
  
 161. Id. 
 162. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 163. Circuit courts sharply differ on what constitutes a culpable state of mind. 
See SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 219-24. 
 164. Id. at 218. 
 165. Id. at 218-19. 
 166. FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
 167. Dismissal is generally viewed as the ultimate sanction. Browning, Burn 
after Reading, supra note 1, at 297. 
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penalties.168  
Crucially, Rule 37(e) provides an exception for failure to 
provide ESI.169 “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court 
may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for 
failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a 
result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
information system.”170 Rule 37(e) recognizes that some 
electronic systems designed to meet a party’s needs may 
include “alteration and overwriting of information, often 
without the operator’s specific direction or awareness.”171 The 
analysis turns on good faith: “[A] party is not permitted to 
exploit the routine operation of an information system to 
thwart discovery obligations” for ESI that must be 
preserved.172 A court may assess good faith through various 
factors, such as the steps the party took to comply with a 
court order or agreement to preserve ESI, or whether the 
party reasonably believes discoverable information will not 
be reasonably accessible.173 Regarding the “routine operation” 
element, the District Court of Connecticut held that in order 
to take advantage of the Rule 37(e) preservation exception, 
the party had “to act affirmatively to prevent the system from 
destroying or altering [ESI], even if . . . destruction . . . 
occur[s] in the regular course of business.”174 Further, the 
court stated the loss of information must be due to a routine 
electronic system in place before litigation.175  
  
 168. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b); Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 281. 
 169. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). Rule 37(e) was also added in 2006; it was originally 
Rule 37(f), and has since been changed (it is cited as Rule 37(f) in early case law). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006); see SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, 
supra note 47, at 218 n.1. 
 170. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (emphasis added). 
 171. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 172. Id. (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. 
 174. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 231-32 (quoting Doe v. Norwalk 
Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007)). 
 175. See id. at 232. 
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D.  Preservation of Ephemeral Data 
Ephemeral data have been treated differently than 
typical ESI by courts and scholars. Although ephemeral data 
are not barred from being part of a preservation order, 
retrieving such data is more difficult than for other kinds of 
data. The Sedona Principles, citing Rule 26 and Convolve, 
Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp.,176 state that the preservation 
obligation for ephemeral data should not impose “heroic or 
unduly burdensome requirements.”177  
But some parties have argued that ephemeral data are 
not ESI at all.178 In Columbia Pictures Industries v. Bunnell, 
defendants argued that RAM, a type of temporary storage, 
did not constitute ESI because the data were never stored on 
their website, nor could it be retrieved or fixed in any tangible 
form.179 Relying on the Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 
34, the District Court for the Central District of California 
rejected defendants’ argument and held that RAM 
constitutes ESI.180 The court further held that despite the 
transitory nature of RAM, the data were in the possession, 
custody, or control of the party.181 Defendants then argued 
that production would be tantamount to creating new data, 
which is prohibited by Rule 34.182 The court rejected this 
argument as well, as the temporary data already existed, so 
  
 176. 223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In Convolve, the court rejected 
sanctions for failure to preserve data on an electronic device where the data were 
automatically overwritten. Id. The court found the defendant had no business to 
maintain these fleeting data. Id. 
 177. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & 
PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 95-96 (2d. ed. 
2007). 
 178. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093 FMC(JCx), 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46364, at *9-10, 21-22 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 
 179. Id. at *21-22. RAM was defined in the case as “a computer component in 
which data and computer programs can be temporarily recorded.” Id. at *23 
(quoting MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
 180. Id. at *24. 
 181. Id. at *25. 
 182. Id. at *26. 
2014] SNAP AND DESTROY 1263 
an order requiring preservation thereof was appropriate.183 
However, the court did not impose sanctions for spoliation.184  
Despite some case law on temporary data, no cases exist 
about data that is deliberately self-destroying. While the 
Federal Rules were amended to try to keep up with 
technology,185 they offer no guidance on how to treat 
ephemeral communications.186 The Federal Rules were not 
designed for this, and they are struggling to keep up. Soon, 
judges will have to address these significant deficiencies in 
the law. Part III explains problems that may arise for courts 
in this area. 
III. GAPS IN THE PRESERVATION RULES 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure leave no doubt that 
ESI is discoverable and can be subject to a duty to preserve.187 
But what this means for ephemeral data is still uncertain, as 
the broad language of the Federal Rules leaves considerable 
room for interpretation. This Part explores how courts have 
interpreted the language of the Federal Rules in cases 
involving ESI and social media, then explains why the 
current body of law is insufficient to cover self-destroying 
data. This Part also analyzes claims made by Vaporstream 
and Snapchat regarding their legal standing in this area to 
highlight these gaps in the law. 
A.  Spoliation of Social Media and the Gatto Decision 
While no cases have yet assessed ephemeral 
communications programs, a handful of cases have dealt with 
spoliation of social media.188 In the earliest known social 
networking spoliation case, the District Court of Puerto Rico 
held that courts will regard spoliation of social media in the 
  
 183. Id. at *26-27. 
 184. Id. at *55. 
 185. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 186. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 34. 
 187. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 34 advisory committee’s notes (2006). 
 188. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 285. 
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same way as any other kind of evidence destruction.189 
Another District Court in Texas held a defendant’s decision 
to make his Facebook profile private and remove his last 
name from his band’s website constituted spoliation and 
supported an adverse inference jury instruction; the 
defendant had been trying to protect his identity after fleeing 
the scene of a bar fight.190 Contrastingly, in a case involving 
trademark-infringing trade dress, a defendant restaurant 
changed its profile picture, which had contained images of 
the infringing trade dress.191 The New Jersey District Court 
did not impose spoliation sanctions here, noting the unique 
features of Facebook, where “[a]ctive users often change their 
pictures weekly.”192 This demonstrates judges can be 
cognizant of the nature of new technologies and how they are 
used, which impacts their ultimate rulings. 
The holding in Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc.193 may also 
provide insight into the ephemeral data preservation 
problem. In Gatto, a personal injury suit, a discovery request 
was made for Gatto’s social media accounts, including his 
Facebook profile.194 After initially refusing, Gatto was 
ordered to give opposing counsel access to his Facebook 
password.195 Gatto was later notified by Facebook that an 
unknown IP address (which turned out to be opposing 
counsel) was accessing his account; he allegedly became 
scared that he was being “hacked” and deactivated his 
profile.196 Pursuant to Facebook policy, all of Gatto’s data 
  
 189. Torres v. Lexington Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 533 (D.P.R. 2006). 
 190. See In re Platt, No. 11-12367-CAG, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5075, at *7-8 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2012); see also Browning, Burn after Reading, supra 
note 1, at 285-86. 
 191. Katiroll Co. v. Kati Roll & Platters, Inc., No. 10-3620 GEB, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 85212, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2011). 
 192. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 294 (citing Katiroll, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85212, at *10-11). 
 193. Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 10-CV-1090-ES-SCM, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41909 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013). 
 194. Id. at *3-4. 
 195. Id. at *4. 
 196. Id. at *6-7. 
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were permanently deleted fourteen days after deactivation.197 
When the defendants moved for spoliation sanctions, Gatto 
claimed he did not intentionally destroy or suppress 
evidence, which should defeat any motion for sanctions.198 
The District Court of New Jersey disagreed, holding that 
even if Gatto did not intend to permanently deprive the 
defendants of the Facebook data, he did intentionally 
deactivate his profile and failed to reactivate it before the 
data were deleted.199  
The Gatto decision marks an expansion of the “culpable 
state of mind” element of spoliation.200 Normally, the test for 
spoliation relies on the party’s nefarious intent; the Gatto 
court found intent to spoil irrelevant.201 This is a more results-
oriented analysis of spoliation. Because Gatto effectively 
caused the deletion of data that was subject to a discovery 
request, a spoliation sanction (an adverse jury instruction) 
was appropriate.202 While Gatto is only a district court case, 
it was cited in two other cases in the months after its 
release.203  
Gatto could have significant implications for the use of 
ephemeral communication programs. Under a duty to 
preserve, Gatto committed spoliation by deactivating his 
Facebook account and unwittingly causing deletion of his 
data.204 What does that mean for individuals who 
intentionally cause deletion of data by choosing an app like 
  
 197. Id. After the information was permanently deleted, the parties agreed to 
have Gatto download the information, seemingly unaware the information was in 
fact gone forever. Id. 
 198. Id. at *11-12. 
 199. Id. at *12-14. 
 200. See Michael Schmidt & Cozen O’Connor, The Duty To Preserve Social 
Media Information, JDSUPRA BUSINESS ADVISOR (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.
jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-duty-to-preserve-social-media-inform-80011. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See Gatto, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41909, at *14-15. 
 203. Premier Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Duhon, Nos. 12-1498, 12-2790, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 166661, at *33 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2013); Frazier v. Bed Bath & 
Beyond Inc., No. 2:10-05398, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61185, at *19 (D.N.J. Apr. 
30, 2013). 
 204. Gatto, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41909, at *11-14. 
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Snapchat? Using a communication medium you know will 
destroy the data seems more culpable than what Gatto did. 
This would be bad news for Snapchat and Vaporstream 
users. But if litigation arises in this area, ephemeral data 
users would likely attempt to fall back on the expansive 
language of the Federal Rules, which could produce an 
entirely different result. 
B.  Broad Language in the Federal Rules and Rule 37(e) 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically its 
preservation and ESI rules, were constructed broadly to 
encompass future changes in technology.205 However, parties 
using ephemeral communications may try to use this 
broadness to escape those rules. There are various language 
choices that could become fertile grounds for debate. 
As discussed earlier, ESI stored in any medium in a 
reasonably usable form is discoverable.206 Parties are also 
permitted to specify the form of the ESI.207 But ESI must be 
produced in a form “in which it is ordinarily maintained or in 
a reasonably usable form.”208 For an application like 
Snapchat, this becomes tricky. Before they are viewed, Snaps 
are “maintained” as the picture or video content itself. After 
viewing, however, Snaps are “maintained” in the form of a 
message log. A party seeking Snaps in discovery may argue 
a “reasonably usable form” would be the image or video itself, 
which would likely be gone by then. Which form should a 
party be allowed to demand during discovery?  
Preservation becomes a difficult issue as well. Once 
parties have a duty to preserve, are they obligated to make 
all efforts to preserve a Snap or a Vaporstream message? The 
Federal Rules indicate that inaccessibility does not relieve a 
party of its preservation obligation.209 Therein lies the tension 
between ephemeral communications and preservation: how 
  
 205. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 206. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a). 
 207. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C). 
 208. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). 
 209. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 56. 
2014] SNAP AND DESTROY 1267 
can you preserve something you no longer have access to? 
Should a party be required to screenshot or save all 
ephemeral data?210 If a party does not do so, has it failed to 
act “thoughtfully, reasonably, and in good faith”211 in 
preserving ESI? 
Analyzing the spoliation language of the Federal Rules 
also reveals potential problems. The “culpable state of mind” 
requirement varies widely across courts, but the Gatto 
decision construes the term broadly.212 Gatto was sanctioned 
for spoliation for intentionally deactivating his profile and 
not reactivating it for data collection.213 For parties under 
preservation obligations, this could be akin to sending an 
ephemeral message without first saving it. Do Snapchat and 
Vaporstream users have a culpable state of mind by merely 
using the programs and not saving the content they send or 
receive? The Federal Rules, as drafted, cannot answer this 
question and many others in the ephemeral data realm. 
The primary area of future debate in this area will almost 
assuredly be the Rule 37(e) exception for failure to provide 
ESI.214 While Rule 37(e) has seldom been relied upon in the 
past,215 when litigation arises in the ephemeral ESI realm, 
attorneys seeking to avoid discovery will use this “safe 
harbor”216 as ammunition. All kinds of ephemeral data users 
will try to categorize their actions as use of a “routine, good-
faith operation of an electronic system.”217 The elements of 
  
 210. For Snapchat users, screenshots notify the sender of the message. For 
recipients to screenshot everything for the sake of preservation would certainly 
raise some red flags for the sender, which may cause the sender to stop sending 
Snaps all together.  
 211. Walworth et al., supra note 155. 
 212. Schmidt & O’Connor, supra note 200. 
 213. Gatto v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 10-CV-1090-ES-SCM, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 41909, at *11-14 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013). 
 214. “Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions 
under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored 
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic 
system.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) (emphasis added). 
 215. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 229. 
 216. See id. 
 217. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
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routine operation and good faith will be the main points of 
contention for courts.  
A handful of cases have dealt with the “routine 
operation” requirement of Rule 37(e). In Doe v. Norwalk 
Community College, the District Court of Connecticut cited 
two reasons for sanctioning a college that wiped email data 
from its servers: (1) in order to take advantage of Rule 37(e), 
a party must act affirmatively to prevent destruction or 
alteration of information, even if such destruction would 
occur in the regular course of business (a litigation hold); and 
(2) a routine system must already be in place for the Rule to 
apply.218 This second reason also led a Texas District Court to 
decline sanctioning a police department that had a 
preexisting policy of keeping transmissions for ninety days.219 
The reasoning makes sense; parties should not be 
manufacturing routine deletion systems after a duty to 
preserve arises.  
However, the first reason stated in Doe—requiring a 
party to prevent the deletion of routinely deleted data—
provides another problem for ephemeral data users: how 
should this data be preserved? Would this require a Snapchat 
user to press the “save” button every time the user sends a 
Snap, or take a screenshot every time the user receives one? 
How would this work for Vaporstream, Confide, and other 
apps that actively discourage screenshots? Ephemeral data 
programs premise themselves on routine deletion of data, so 
the only latitude in the “routine operation” element may be 
expansions like the Doe holding. 
The Rule 37(e) exception—and perhaps the entire issue 
of ephemeral data preservation—could turn on good faith. A 
crucial comment in the Advisory Committee’s Notes states: 
“[A] party is not permitted to exploit the routine operation of 
  
 218. Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007). 
 219. Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72706, at 
*49-56 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2007). Plaintiffs in this case requested preservation in 
a notice of claim, then alleged the police department violated the preservation 
obligation because the notice of claim arrived within the ninety-day window. The 
court held that the notice of claim was not specific enough, and that since the 
police department preserved all residence it believed to be relevant, sanctions 
were not appropriate. Id.  
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an information system to thwart discovery obligations by 
allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy 
specific stored information that is required to preserve.”220 
While the Advisory Committee says good faith may be found 
where a party takes steps to preserve ESI,221 the Doe decision 
mandating litigation holds for a finding of good faith has been 
followed several times.222 Other courts have developed similar 
doctrines; the District Court for the District of Columbia held 
that “this Rule does not exempt a party who fails to stop the 
operation of a system that is obliterating information that 
may be discoverable in litigation.”223 Several other cases have 
aligned with this reasoning.224 These cases may show a trend 
toward this particular interpretation of Rule 37(e), which has 
significant implications in the ephemeral data preservation 
debate.  
If ephemeral data programs are categorized as routine, 
good-faith operation of electronic systems, the only other way 
to exclude data transmitted over programs like Vaporstream 
from Rule 37(e) protection would be to categorize its evidence 
deletion as an exceptional circumstance. According to the 
Advisory Committee’s Notes, this provision recognizes the 
need for a court to protect an entirely innocent party 
requesting discovery against serious prejudice that would 
  
 220. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006); see also Disability 
Rights Council v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 242 F.R.D. 139, 146 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 221. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 222. See Slovin v. Target Corp., No. 12-CV-863, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31858, 
at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Nicholson v. Bd. of Trs. for the Conn. State Univ. 
Sys., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103094, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2011); Johnson v. 
Waterford Hotel Grp., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-800, 2011 U.S Dist. LEXIS 103094, at *14 
(D. Conn. Jan. 11, 2011); Siani v. State Univ. of N.Y., No. CV09-407, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 82562, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2010); Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. 
v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 618 n.19 (S.D. Tex. 2010); Toussie v. Cnty. of 
Suffolk, No. CV 01-6716, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93988, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 
2007). 
 223. Disability Rights Council, 242 F.R.D. at 146. 
 224. Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007); see also Wollam v. Wright 
Med. Grp., Inc., No. 10-cv-03104, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106768, at *3-6 (D. Colo. 
Sept. 20, 2011); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587, 620 (D.N.J. 
2010); Cohen v. City of New York, 255 F.R.D. 110, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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arise from the loss of potentially important ESI.225 Could a 
party seeking sanctions argue—as a last resort—that 
ephemeral data apps constitute an exceptional circumstance?  
Neither the Advisory Committee nor the courts have 
addressed what exactly constitutes an “exceptional 
circumstance.”226 The District of Columbia District Court held 
automatic deletion in an email system was not an exceptional 
circumstance worthy of spoliation sanctions.227 This marks 
one of the few times a court has actually assessed with 
specificity a claim that a circumstance is exceptional. 
Generally, courts will only find exceptional circumstances for 
an “exceptionally prejudicial loss of evidence.”228 At least two 
authors have argued this gives judges “tremendous 
discretion” in applying this rule.229 However, this means little 
when judges do not actually use the exceptional 
circumstances provision to justify decisions. In ephemeral 
data litigation, courts may soon be challenged to define what 
exceptional circumstances are, and whether use of a program 
like Snapchat could suffice. 
C.  Vaporstream, Snapchat, and Law Enforcement 
The websites for Vaporstream and Snapchat offer their 
own explanations of each company’s legal obligations (or lack 
thereof) when it comes to discovery.230 Preparing to use the 
Federal Rules as ammunition, Vaporstream has stocked up 
its arsenal by preemptively hiding behind Rule 37(e), using 
its broad language in marketing.231 One Frequently Asked 
Question on Vaporstream’s website asks, “Am I guilty of 
  
 225. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 226. Nicole D. Wright, Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e): Spoiling the 
Spoliation Doctrine, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 793, 818 (2009) (citing Rachel Hytken, 
Electronic Discovery: To What Extent Do the 2006 Amendments Satisfy Their 
Purposes?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 875, 895 (2008)). 
 227. Peskoff, 244 F.R.D. at 61. 
 228. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 229. 
 229. Wright, supra note 226, at 818 (quoting Hytken, supra note 226, at 895). 
 230. See Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, supra note 71; Vaporstream FAQ, 
supra note 20. 
 231. See Vaporstream FAQ, supra note 20. 
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hiding something by even using Vaporstream?”232 The 
company’s reassuring response:  
Absolutely not. In fact, routine, good faith destruction of electronic 
and other information under a defensible records and information 
management program is supported both by case law and the recent 
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides 
safe harbor from negative inference. Just because Vaporstream 
does not create a record in the first place, does not make one guilty 
of spoliation.233  
Vaporstream is practically calling out Rule 37(e) by 
name, tipping its hand to indicate how it would handle 
preservation issues—and all but declaring itself immune 
from preservation duties and sanctions. Vaporstream’s 
Frequently Asked Questions repeated the language more 
than once—though this inflammatory language has now 
been conspicuously removed, as mentioned earlier.234 Other 
ephemeral data programs have comparable methods of 
operation and could similarly attempt to use Rule 37(e) as a 
shield. Does this contravene the purpose of Rule 37(e)? If a 
preservation order is issued, who would be at fault: the party 
who would not keep the evidence, or the party who requested 
something unreasonable?235 
Vaporstream’s Frequently Asked Questions address 
other litigation concerns in a similar fashion.236 Vaporstream 
states its anti-screenshot technology “negat[es] screen 
capture discovery.”237 The company also stresses discovery 
cannot possibly take place because Vaporstream does not 
create ESI.238 The site states preservation obligations almost 
never apply to all communications, and because Vaporstream 
is like face-to-face conversation, a legal hold situation is 
  
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id.; see also supra notes 20, 99, & 101. 
 235. Rule 34 requires production of evidence in “a reasonably usable form.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii).  
 236. Vaporstream FAQ, supra note 20. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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impliedly unlikely.239 On its home page, Vaporstream touts 
its service as the best way to steer clear of “an avoidable 
eDiscovery event.”240 So far, Vaporstream users have seen 
success in the courts. Lawyers have attempted to introduce 
evidence of a company’s Vaporstream use at least thirty-one 
times; none have succeeded.241 
Contrastingly, Snapchat appears to be more agreeable 
when it comes to legal process. According to Snapchat’s Legal 
Enforcement Guide, the application complies with the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act,242 which mandates 
disclosure of certain user information in response to legal 
process.243 Snapchat may disclose user identity info, login 
info, and account content in response to subpoenas, court 
orders, and search warrants.244 Snapchat also complies with 
preservation requests for information from active accounts.245 
The application will also disclose info voluntarily if Snapchat 
believes, in good faith, that an emergency involving danger 
or serious physical injury to any person requires immediate 
disclosure of the info.246 Snapchat can also divulge 
information with user consent.247 Presently, all of this 
information seems to be discoverable. 
The intriguing question, however, is whether someone 
can discover Snaps themselves. Apparently, Snapchat can 
only access and produce unopened snaps.248 These also 
appear to be discoverable. According to Snapchat’s blog, 
between May 2013 and October 14, 2013, approximately one 
  
 239. Id. 
 240. Vaporstream Home Page, supra note 101. 
 241. Hechler, supra note 111. 
 242. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
 243. Snapchat Law Enforcement Guide, supra note 71. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Schaffer, supra note 19. 
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dozen search warrants resulted in production of unopened249 
Snaps to law enforcement.250 With 350 million Snaps being 
sent every day as of October 14, 2013,251 the percentage of 
Snaps unveiled for legal purposes during that time period 
was miniscule. But if users have found ways to access deleted 
Snaps,252 are these also discoverable and subject to 
preservation? Senders certainly would not have known their 
messages would be intercepted.253 It is unclear how a court 
will treat this evidence. 
As mentioned earlier, there is one major difference 
between Vaporstream and applications like Snapchat. While 
Snaps are stored on an intermediate server, Vaporstream 
messages are not; the peer-to-peer nature of the 
communication allows Vaporstream to claim that it does not 
create ESI at all.254 If Vaporstream’s assertion is correct, 
would that automatically exempt programs like Vaporstream 
from electronic discovery and leave apps like Snapchat 
subject to it? This result seems incongruous.  
It is clear that auto-deletion changes how discovery 
works. Instead of being a business with a routine destruction 
policy, individuals and companies are utilizing applications 
whose business is to destroy. Therein lies the difference 
between incidentally ephemeral data (such as RAM) and 
designedly ephemeral data. The Federal Rules and the courts 
have only dealt with the former, and Part IV deals with the 
latter. 
  
 249. As mentioned earlier, unopened Snaps stay on servers for thirty days. 
Team Snapchat, supra note 65. 
 250. Schaffer, supra note 19. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Snapchat Unveiled, supra note 77. 
 253. It is worth noting that despite Snapchat’s many claims of Snap secrecy and 
integrity, its Privacy Policy contains an ominous warning. “[T]here may be ways 
to access messages while still in temporary storage on recipients’ devices or, 
forensically, even after they are deleted. You should not use Snapchat to send 
messages if you want to be certain that the recipient cannot keep a copy.” 
Snapchat Privacy Policy, supra note 41. 
 254. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 307; Vaporstream FAQ, 
supra note 20. 
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IV. ADDRESSING EPHEMERAL DATA PROBLEMS 
With the rising popularity of ephemeral data programs, 
courts will soon have to address discovery questions they do 
not yet have the answers to. Answers must be gleaned in part 
from existing authority, but this body of authority is not yet 
sufficient to manage these new issues. The law must adapt. 
This Part outlines how courts should treat ephemeral 
communications and offers other potential remedies to 
correct the shortcomings of the law in this area. 
Preliminarily, courts must determine whether all self-
destroying messages are ESI. This impacts whether the 
Federal Rules apply to these programs at all. Vaporstream 
strongly asserts its program does not create business records 
or ESI.255 However, if programs like Vaporstream are correct 
in that claim while applications like Snapchat are 
categorized as ESI, Vaporstream users would evade 
repercussions despite doing the same deeds that Snapchat 
users could get sanctioned for. Allowing Vaporstream to 
avoid sanctions due to its design would produce an absurd 
result. Further, Vaporstream’s claim that it is not ESI 
because it is never stored on a server is without merit. The 
content is stored in video RAM, which is highly volatile and 
constantly overwritten,256 but it is still “stored” in some 
meaningful sense. As drafted, the Federal Rules do not yet 
address this nuance. Until they do, courts should regard all 
ephemeral data technologies as ESI so the Federal Rules can 
apply to them. 
Similarly, for the purposes of ESI discovery, courts 
should treat all ephemeral data programs in roughly the 
same way. Each application operates differently, but the idea 
of impermanent communications is constant. Vaporstream 
messages may never be stored on a server like Snaps are, but 
it would be unjust to regard the programs differently in 
discovery rulings. Not only would this be an inconsistent 
application of the Federal Rules, but if Vaporstream was 
essentially exempted from the Federal Rules, ephemeral 
data users would flock to it. Imagine the marketing 
advantage: “Vaporstream, the only messaging service that 
  
 255. Id. 
 256. Krause, supra note 98. 
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insulates you from the law.” Such a result contravenes the 
purpose of the Federal Rules. While some cases may turn on 
a more nuanced detail of an ephemeral data program, the 
programs should be placed into the same category. This 
ensures the Federal Rules will apply evenly and 
appropriately across the ephemeral data realm. 
A.  Federal Rules 26 and 34 
Working in conjunction, do Federal Rules 26 and 34 
require production of ephemeral data? The first hurdle to 
producing such evidence is Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), which 
instructs courts to limit discovery if the burden of producing 
the evidence outweighs its likely benefit.257 This Rule must 
always be taken on a case-by-case basis, as it is specific to 
what the particular ESI would add to the case. The next 
barrier is Rule 26(b)(2)(B), stating a party need not produce 
ESI from sources not reasonably accessible.258 Getting past 
this roadblock requires a showing of good cause, which is 
outlined in seven factors.259 This also must be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis, as the seven factors are fact-specific.  
But courts can begin to construct some uniform 
standards when the analysis reaches Rule 34. Judges must 
determine whether ephemeral communications can be 
produced in a “reasonably usable form” and what that form 
actually is.260 For self-destroying technologies that keep a log, 
as Snapchat does, judges can feel secure in allowing discovery 
of the log at the very least. Like a phone record, it will provide 
only the identities of the two parties and when they 
communicated. But Vaporstream and many other programs 
do not keep logs.261 The only “reasonably usable” form left is 
the message itself, which is meant to appear quickly and 
vanish.262 
  
 257. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 258. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B). 
 259. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 260. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). 
 261. Browning, Burn after Reading, supra note 1, at 306-07. 
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This tension is echoed in the Federal Rules themselves. 
While the Federal Rules say a party need not produce unduly 
burdensome evidence, the Advisory Committee’s Notes stress 
the language of Rule 34 was constructed broadly “to 
encompass future developments in computer technology.”263 
Where should courts draw the line? Coupled with the Federal 
Rules’ expansive intent, judges should consider how 
litigating against an ephemeral data user who performs 
illegal activity without leaving a trace behind would cripple 
opposing parties. Parties should not be completely immune 
from discovery and spoliation sanctions merely because they 
chose Vaporstream over Gmail, or Snapchat over text 
messaging. Such a result is inequitable, especially because 
those actors chose ephemeral communications with self-
destruction in mind.  
For these reasons, judges should continue the expansion 
of Rule 34 and allow all ephemeral messages to be 
discoverable ESI.264 This preserves justice and parity in the 
discovery phase and aligns with the intent of the Federal 
Rules to encompass future technologies. This should be done 
carefully, and parties—on a case-by-case basis—should 
satisfy most or all of the seven factors for a showing of good 
cause to compel discovery of ESI.265 Courts must avoid the 
prejudice that would result from forbidding self-destroying 
messages to be put through the analysis in the first place. 
B.  Preservation Orders  
If ephemeral ESI is discoverable, then it must also be 
subject to preservation orders and duties to preserve. This 
  
 263. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
 264. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Bunnell, No. CV 06-1093, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46364, at *28-32 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2007) (expanding the meaning of ESI 
to include temporary RAM storage). 
 265. Factors for courts to consider include: (1) specificity of the discovery 
request; (2) quantity of information available from other, more easily accessed 
sources; (3) failure to provide relevant information that once existed but is no 
longer easily accessible; (4) likelihood of finding relevant information that cannot 
be obtained from more accessible sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and 
usefulness of further information; (6) importance of the issues at stake; and (7) 
each party’s resources. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2006). 
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supports the general interpretation of the Federal Rules that 
all relevant evidence should be preserved and that 
“mere . . . inaccessibility does not relieve a party of 
preservation obligation[s].”266 But this also must be evaluated 
on a case-by-case basis, as a party should not be subjected to 
wholly unreasonable discovery.267 Importantly, allowing 
judges to consider ephemeral communications as 
discoverable ESI can allow them to properly evaluate each 
case. Without this inclusion, however, self-destroying data 
are essentially barred from consideration as discoverable 
evidence.  
As mentioned earlier, courts consider a three-part 
balancing test for issuing preservation orders. Judges 
consider the: (1) level of concern for the continuing existence 
and maintenance of the evidence without a preservation 
order; (2) irreparable harm likely to result from destruction 
of evidence; and (3) capability of the party to maintain the 
evidence sought to be preserved.268 Ephemeral 
communications primarily impact the first and third factors. 
Judges should be concerned that the evidence will be erased, 
as that is what ephemeral data programs are designed to do. 
Absent efforts to save the content, these factors should 
almost always weigh in favor of the party seeking the 
ephemeral communications. 
Ephemeral data users would contend that they do not 
have the ability to maintain the evidence under the third 
factor. Snapchat users would likely not get very far with this 
argument. In addition to screenshots, the new save button 
and “My Story” features have made keeping Snaps easier 
than ever. For these reasons, a judge should be permitted to 
order preservation of Snaps. Given Snapchat’s new features, 
saving such data is not unduly burdensome. Many other self-
destroying applications permit screenshots, which would be 
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the most universally applicable way to order preservation of 
ephemeral communications.  
But what about programs that discourage screenshots? 
The sender name and content never appear on the screen at 
once on Vaporstream and Confide.269 Taking a screenshot of 
the message without seeing who sent it may render such 
evidence inadmissible. Further, courts may regard taking 
screenshots as an unreasonable endeavor for a producing 
party to undertake. Vaporstream recently debuted its 
VaporIGM platform, which saves some transitory 
messages.270 But this would not include all Vaporstream 
messages, so instructing a party to turn over its VaporIGM 
messages would likely not provide the evidence a party 
opponent would be looking for. 
Ken Withers suggests tweaking the factors listed above 
for ephemeral data preservation.271 According to Withers, 
courts should consider: (1) whether the data are uniquely 
relevant to the litigation; (2) how the data are treated by the 
party in the ordinary course of business; (3) whether 
preservation imposes undue costs or burdens relative to the 
value of the data; and (4) whether technologies exist to 
preserve the data.272 This presents a more tailored, albeit 
insufficient, solution to preservation of self-destroying data. 
Firstly, it is unclear how exactly courts would treat the 
second factor. It is clear the party using ephemeral 
communications treat them as vanishing messages. Parties 
are using such programs so that their “ordinary course of 
business” leaves no trace. On that point, the analysis 
provides little guidance as to the form of ESI courts can ask 
parties to preserve. Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the 
second factor, Withers’ suggestions are a small step in the 
right direction for how courts should assess preservation of 
ephemeral communications.  
  
 269. Vaporstream FAQ, supra note 20; see Yarow, supra note 6. 
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P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i). 
2014] SNAP AND DESTROY 1279 
Even Withers’ more tailored factors still cannot address 
how to compel preservation of messages from Vaporstream 
and similar programs. Even with a broadened definition of 
ESI and an expansion of preservation rules, some ephemeral 
communications may simply be impossible to preserve 
without unduly burdensome efforts. However, if courts 
stopped the analysis here and concluded Vaporstream and 
similar types of messages cannot be preserved in any 
capacity, users could run rampant with potentially unlawful 
messaging. Courts and opposing parties would be powerless 
to stop it. For this reason, a more stringent solution is 
warranted. 
C.  Litigation Holds and Cessation of Use 
Under the current body of law on the ephemeral data 
issue, the most effective way to compel preservation of self-
destroying evidence is a litigation hold. This action would 
have precedential support through cases like the 
aforementioned Doe decision.273 There, the District Court 
held failure to issue a litigation hold warranted spoliation 
sanctions.274 Litigation holds require parties act affirmatively 
to prevent destruction of information, even if it occurs in the 
regular course of business.275 For self-destroying 
communications, deletion is the regular course of business. 
Litigation holds cannot bring back data that has already been 
deleted, but it can prevent evidence from future destruction. 
However, users will be unsure how to implement a litigation 
hold while utilizing these programs. Normally, suspension of 
a routine deletion policy might involve a company halting its 
own procedures that regularly destroy records or delete 
emails.276 But Vaporstream users cannot tell Vaporstream to 
stop deleting their communications.  
One answer here is for a litigation hold to require 
cessation of all ephemeral technology use. Discontinuing use 
is the only feasible way for users of programs like 
Vaporstream to act affirmatively to prevent destruction of 
  
 273. See Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007).  
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 276. See SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 65. 
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information. This is consistent with the traditional use of a 
litigation hold. Perhaps there is some room for Snapchat 
users to continue use, so long as they preserve the 
information in one of the aforementioned ways. But absent 
such methods, litigation holds should mandate termination 
of ephemeral data use.  
Opponents may argue changing communication 
programs would be an undue burden. Courts would have to 
weigh this burden against the peril resulting from 
destruction of evidence and how likely this destruction is. 
The nature of ephemeral data programs should nearly 
always tip the scale against the party under the litigation 
hold. The threat to the evidence and the injustice that results 
from allowing its destruction necessitate as much. Further, 
it is unlikely that a person or company’s sole means of 
communication is through self-destroying data programs. 
Switching to their other, less secretive messaging method(s) 
is likely not an undue burden. 
D.  Spoliation and the Rule 37(e) Exception 
Once a judge compels production of ephemeral 
communications or a litigation hold is instituted, can 
ephemeral ESI destruction be sanctioned under Rule 37? To 
date, no court has sanctioned a party for failure to preserve 
such data.277 Of the three elements of spoliation, use of 
ephemeral data programs primarily falls under the second 
element requiring a culpable state of mind.278 The 
determinations of what a culpable state of mind is and 
whether sanctions are appropriate for ESI destruction differ 
greatly across federal courts.279 Again, there is little guidance 
  
 277. SCHEINDLIN & CAPRA, supra note 47, at 63. 
 278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.  
 279. The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits require a finding of bad faith to 
sanction a party for failure to produce ESI. SCHEINDLIN & CARPRA, supra note 47, 
at 223. The Second, Third, D.C., and Federal Circuits have held that negligence 
is sufficient to establish culpability. Id. at 219-21, 223. The Ninth Circuit requires 
willfulness, fault, or bad faith. Id. at 223. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits require 
willfulness, which is somewhere between negligence and bad faith. Id. The 
Eleventh Circuit varies by case. Id. at 224. The Eighth Circuit has required some 
indication of intent to destroy evidence in order to obstruct the truth. See id. The 
2014] SNAP AND DESTROY 1281 
in the current body of law to determine how a court should 
treat ephemeral data programs, but as it stands, the Circuits 
could go in various directions on the issue.  
The Gatto decision is a timely expansion of the “culpable 
state of mind” requirement that has practical applications in 
the ephemeral data debate.280 Gatto made a choice that 
caused deletion of Facebook information that was subject to 
a discovery request.281 He allegedly did not intend to deprive 
the opposing party of relevant evidence, but the court found 
his intent irrelevant.282 If the Gatto reasoning is applied to 
ephemeral data usage, the result is clear: users of self-
destroying technologies possess the requisite culpable state 
of mind for a finding of spoliation. Snapchat and 
Vaporstream users are effectively causing the deletion of 
their data regardless of whether they intend to destroy 
evidence. Further, if destruction without intent can be 
sanctioned, deletion with the intent to suppress evidence is 
also worthy of sanction. If courts align with the District of 
New Jersey’s reasoning, all ephemeral data users would be 
sanctioned for spoliation, given that the other two spoliation 
factors283 are met. 
Federal courts may opt for a more stringent standard 
than Gatto. Circuit courts have applied various standards for 
a finding of a culpable state of mind, including mere 
negligence, gross negligence, recklessness, bad faith, and 
intentional misconduct.284 Depending on the facts of a given 
case, ephemeral data users could fall into any one of those 
standards. The Circuits will likely continue to split sharply, 
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just as they have in their current definitions of what 
constitutes a culpable state of mind.285 
However, courts should adhere to the standard in Gatto 
in the realm of ephemeral data spoliation. The transitory 
nature of the information and the way the technology is used 
makes this the appropriate standard of review for ephemeral 
ESI spoliation. As mentioned earlier, the interest of fairness 
reigns supreme in preserving ephemeral data, just as it does 
throughout the existing preservation rules.  
Ephemeral data users will almost certainly fight such 
sanctions on Rule 37(e) grounds. Rule 37(e) states that 
absent exceptional circumstances, courts may not sanction 
parties for ESI lost as a result of routine, good-faith operation 
of an electronic system.286 The analysis here turns on good 
faith and exceptional circumstances. 
Good faith may be difficult to pin down, while bad faith 
is relatively easy to demonstrate.287 A party’s active role in 
deleting data, such as deleting emails or use of wiping 
software, will be viewed as bad faith.288 But courts have no 
uniform standard as to what constitutes good faith. If courts 
abide by the Doe decision, a showing of good faith would 
require a litigation hold for Rule 37(e) purposes.289 The 
deletion of data by ephemeral communication programs 
constitutes a “routine operation,” but under the Doe 
reasoning, a party must step in and stop this operation.290 As 
stated earlier, the best way to preserve data transmitted over 
ephemeral data programs is to simply use other programs. 
This is the best case scenario for preservation purposes, and 
litigation holds go a long way toward demonstrating good 
faith to judges. Parties cannot be “permitted to exploit the 
routine operation of an information system to thwart 
discovery obligations” for ESI that must be preserved;291 this 
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is exactly the kind of bad faith Rule 37(e) is designed to 
prevent. 
Courts should align with Doe and hold good faith under 
Rule 37(e) requires a litigation hold. Consequently, a party’s 
choice to use of an ephemeral data program after a duty to 
preserve arises constitutes bad faith. Parties should not be 
permitted to withhold items from discovery by using a secret, 
self-destroying messaging service. Rule 37(e) was meant to 
protect technology users whose regular computer operations 
resulted in incidental losses of temporary data;292 it was not 
intended to provide a shield for ephemeral data programs to 
hide behind. 
Courts also should not deem these situations to be 
“exceptional circumstances.” While elaboration on the term 
is minimal in the current body of law, this should be reserved 
for particularly egregious circumstances where destruction of 
evidence was extraordinarily prejudicial. Mere involvement 
of ephemeral data programs does not rise to the level of 
exceptional circumstances. 
When a court orders sanctions on a party for such 
actions, which are most appropriate in the ephemeral data 
context? As with most of these rules, this should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. Spoliation rulings 
frequently involve monetary sanctions,293 which could be 
appropriate in this context. Dismissal of an entire case is a 
particularly harsh judgment, especially in the ephemeral 
data realm, where users may not intend to commit 
spoliation.294 Courts have a variety of other sanctions at their 
disposal, such as barring evidence or striking pleadings, 
which may be prudent in a particular case.295 
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But a more appropriate sanction for ephemeral data 
users would be an adverse inference jury instruction.296 Here, 
a judge may instruct a jury to infer that missing evidence is 
unfavorable to the party that caused its absence.297 This is 
appealing for ephemeral data sanctions for three reasons. 
First, it permits juries to determine for themselves whether 
use of self-destroying communications is determinative in a 
case. U.S. Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck noted that while 
there is no case law in this area yet, there will be at some 
point.298 Someday, Peck submits, there may be an email that 
suggests that the sender and receiver continue their 
conversation on Vaporstream, which will not look good to a 
jury.299 Second, an adverse inference instruction is a strong 
sanction that can have beneficial deterrent effects on those 
who use ephemeral data programs to circumvent the law. 
Third, it imparts fairness on both parties. For ephemeral 
data users, it gives them an opportunity to convince a jury 
their use of a program like Vaporstream was not for nefarious 
purposes. For the opposing party, it ensures the party does 
not get off scot-free for violating its preservation 
obligations.300 
E.  Other Potential Remedies 
1. Changes to the Federal Rules. Because courts are left 
to interpret a set of rules that have significant gaps, the first 
and primary remedy should be changes to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. As discussed earlier, the Federal Rules 
were written before ephemeral communications rose in 
popularity.301 Because the current Rules are insufficient to 
guide courts in this new area, they must change to adapt to 
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the times. This can be done either through substantive rule 
changes or through additions to the Advisory Committee’s 
Notes to clarify vague language.  
First, in order to quell any doubts about the nature of 
ephemeral data, the Federal Rules should reflect the fact that 
ephemeral communications are ESI. Courts may have 
already regarded such data as ESI by that time, but placing 
ephemera in that realm allows it to be undoubtedly subject 
to ESI discovery rules. Second, the Federal Rules should 
clarify what it means for evidence to be “ordinarily 
maintained” and what a “reasonably usable form” is under 
Rule 34.302 They need not address programs specifically, but 
courts need more to work with to determine what exactly is 
discoverable. Third, preservation rules must address what to 
do with data that is not meant to be preserved. Courts will be 
scrambling to balance the current language of the Federal 
Rules with unjust situations resulting from ephemeral data 
loss. Judges have no guidance on whether ephemeral ESI is 
even subject to a preservation order. Finally, the Federal 
Rules must more directly address which kinds of actions fall 
into the Rule 37(e) exception. While the exception has been 
scarcely used to date, courts can assess Rule 37(e) challenges 
with more clarity and direction before a flood of ephemeral 
data users attempt to hide behind it. These changes will not 
necessarily cure the problem, and the Federal Rules should 
not be exclusionary in their narrowness. But these would 
provide a basic framework for courts to work with when 
deciding this new line of cases. 
The Federal Rules could also benefit from additional 
language in the spoliation rules. Elaboration on when parties 
may be sanctioned—specifically for ephemeral ESI 
destruction—would also aid courts in figuring out exactly 
how to assess spoliation situations. The United States 
Courts’ Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has taken a step 
toward clarifying Rule 37 with a proposed amendment to 
Rule 37(e).303 The proposed amendment would split sanctions 
into two categories: (1) remedies and other curative steps 
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short of true sanctions; and (2) typical sanctions courts 
impose now, such as an adverse inference instruction.304 
Curative steps could include recreating or obtaining lost 
information, conducting additional discovery to compensate, 
or pay reasonable expenses resulting from the data loss.305 
Courts would only be permitted to impose sanctions where 
deletion deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity to 
litigate its claim, or the failure to preserve caused substantial 
prejudice and was willful or in bad faith.306 This provision has 
been controversial, and its potential adoption hangs in 
limbo.307 The proposed amendment could be useful in the 
ephemeral data realm to more appropriately sanction parties 
based on their level of culpability. For example, “curative” 
steps could be appropriate for a Snapchat user who 
unwittingly captured something of evidentiary significance 
and let it self-delete. True sanctions would be more suited for 
the corporate executive who sent insider trading tips on 
Vaporstream, counting on the self-deletion protocol to 
absolve him of responsibility.  
Another helpful distinction, either in the Federal Rules 
or in the courts, would be to distinguish inherently 
ephemeral data from designedly ephemeral data. The former 
are data that are incidentally erased frequently as a part of 
another function, such as the RAM of a computer. Designedly 
ephemeral data are programs like Snapchat and 
Vaporstream, constructed for the sole purpose of discreet and 
recordless communications. Setting out the difference could 
aid courts in determining whether a party has a culpable 
state of mind or has acted in bad faith in failing to preserve 
ephemeral data. 
2. Additional Legislative Measures. The United States 
Government could pass legislation to restrict the ability of 
ephemeral data programs to erase all data. If concerns about 
ephemerality abounded among voters, members of the 
Legislative Branch could enact reforms to counter the spread 
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of the programs. The legislative intent of such laws would 
likely be watched closely by courts as they determine exactly 
how to treat this data. Contrastingly, legislation could be 
adopted that promotes impermanent data. For example, one 
proposed law, called the Online User Data Expiration Act 
(OUDEA), would require all U.S. websites that allow users to 
post self-generated content to provide data destruction 
technology for such content.308 Congressional emphasis on 
promoting impermanence would have significant 
ramifications for ephemeral data in the courts, likely leading 
to a loosening of the restrictions on ephemeral data users in 
litigation suggested in this Comment. Interestingly, 
ephemeral data companies have begun to hire lobbyists to 
influence politics in Washington D.C. should any such 
legislation arise.309 However, some experts are unsure that 
legislation for ephemeral data programs would be useful.310  
3. Hacking or Recalling Old Deleted Files. As discussed 
earlier, Snaps may be recoverable through a hack or by 
accessing certain folders in the hard drives of Android 
devices.311 Further, ephemeral data programs may eventually 
be subject to hacking breaches, despite their rigorous 
security encryption measures.312 What if ephemeral messages 
never truly disappear? Are these messages discoverable? 
Ephemeral data that have been recalled by whatever 
means should still be discoverable and subject to 
preservation. If ephemeral data users allow discoverable 
data to be erased only to recover it later, it should still be 
usable in a trial. The fact that it is obtained after the fact 
should not change its treatment in court. In a way, this result 
is a better outcome for courts and litigants. Not only do you 
get the evidence back into the case, but a judge and jury can 
  
 308. Karen Majovski, Comment, Data Expiration, Let the User Decide: Proposed 
Legislation for Online User-Generated Content, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 807, 818-19 
(2013). 
 309. Warren Communications News, Inc., Tech Lobbying Seen Pushing for Anti-
SLAPP, Data Breach Laws, WASH. INTERNET DAILY (Jan. 13, 2014). 
 310. Warren Communications News, Inc., Snapchat Attack Leaves Experts 
Divided Over Whether Legislation Would Enhance Data Security, WASH. 
INTERNET DAILY (Jan. 6, 2014).  
 311. Snapchat Unveiled, supra note 77. 
 312. Hechler, supra note 111. 
1288 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
see exactly what a party may have been attempting to hide 
by using an ephemeral data program. This allows courts to 
more accurately assess the spoliation factors to determine 
the appropriate sanctions.  
CONCLUSION 
The recommendations of this Comment come down 
particularly hard on ephemeral data users. This stance is 
born out of concern for parties lacking evidence to sustain 
valid claims while ephemeral data users hide behind the very 
rules designed to protect those parties. The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were not constructed for this, but this does 
not mean ephemeral data users should be immune from the 
law. The Federal Rules are deliberately broad to encompass 
technological advancements. Judges are often cognizant of 
how new technologies are used, so they can broadly interpret 
the Federal Rules to decide cases appropriately based on the 
specific features of the technology.313 But ephemeral data 
users can use that broadness against opposing parties to 
avoid punishment for letting evidence destroy itself. Until 
the Federal Rules are clearer on the issue, courts should err 
on the side of preserving all ephemeral communications and 
levying sanctions against parties who fail to do so. A contrary 
result would permit ephemeral data users to escape legal 
consequences until the Federal Rules are updated in this 
area, which may never happen at all.  
As human interaction changes, the popularity of 
ephemeral communications will continue to rise. Failure to 
address the shortcomings in the traditional framework of 
discovery and evidentiary rules would have dire 
consequences for the legal system and electronic discovery.  
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